California Landlords\u27 Duty to Protect Tenants from Criminals by Brown, Karen M.
CALIFORNIA LANDLORDS' DUTY TO PROTECT
TENANTS FROM CRIMINALS
This Comment examines the status of a California landlord's
duty to provide security measures for his tenant. Recent appel-
late cases have required prior criminal acts on the premises as a
prerequisite to holding a landlord liable in tort for criminal acts.
This Comment suggests that the focus should be on whether the
landlord has been reasonable in providing protective measures.
In addition, minimum safety requirements should be legislatively
enacted.
INTRODUCTION
A few jurisdictions now depart from traditional doctrines of
landlord tort immunity from tenant suits for third-party criminal
acts on the premises.' California has not yet determined what
protective measures, if any, a landlord must provide his tenant to
guard against such acts.
An analysis of the current status of a California landlord's duty
to provide security measures requires an examination of two
overlapping duty principles: (1) the landlord's duty to use rea-
sonable care in the management of his property; and (2) an indi-
vidual's duty to protect against third-party criminal acts. The
developments in both of these areas will be examined.
This Comment concludes that California landlords should have
a duty to provide reasonable security measures for their tenants.
The scope of this duty will be determined by the elements of fore-
seeability and reasonableness. This Comment suggests that re-
cent appellate cases that require prior criminal acts on the
premises to fulfill the foreseeability requirement have misplaced
the emphasis. The focus should be on whether the actions of the
landlord have been reasonable.
1. E.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Samson v. Saginaw Prof. Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975);
Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
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LANDLORD'S DUTY TO USE REASONABLE CARE
Landlord's Duty at Common Law
Because negligence is a breach of a duty of care, liability for
negligence can never be found unless the alleged wrongdoer owes
a duty of care to the person injured.2 At common law, landlords
owed no duty of care to tenants;3 they were therefore immune
from tort liability for injuries sustained by tenants on the prem-
ises.4 This immunity dated back to an earlier agrarian society
when responsibility for the premises was governed by the doc-
trine of caveat emptor.5 Because most leases were for agricul-
tural land, the primary purpose of the lease was for the land
itself; the presence or condition of any structures was merely inci-
dental to the agreement. A lease was conceptualized purely as a
conveyance of an interest in land.6 After he conveyed to a tenant,
a landlord lost all rights to possession and control of the leasehold
estate.7 It would have been senseless to hold the landlord liable
for conditions on land which was no longer his to manage.
Although landlord's immunity from tort liability was the gen-
eral rule, it has never been absolute. Through the years, the
courts carved out several exceptions.8 Until 1968, California
courts consistently denied recovery to tenants for injuries sus-
tained on the premises unless one of the exceptions applied.
Landlord's Duty After Rowland v. Christian
In Rowland v. Christian,9 the California Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the historical justifications for the traditional
2. Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal. 2d 488, 127 P.2d 1 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
3. See, e.g., Farber v. Greenberg, 98 Cal. App. 675, 680-81 (1929).
4. 1 CASNER, AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3A5 (1952).
5. The rules regarding the occupation of land were the result of the "high
place which land has traditionally held in English and American thought ....
This sanction of land ownership included notions of its economic importance and
the social desirability of the free use and exploitation of land." HARPER & JAMES,
THE LAw OF TORTS 1432 (1956).
6. 1 CASNER, supra note 4, § 3.11.
7. R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD-TENANT § 4.1 (1980).
8. E.g., Burks v. Blackman, 52 Cal. 2d 715, 344 P.2d 301 (1959) (part of the
premises used in common by the tenants); McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871,
14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961) (statutory duty to repair); Rau v. Redwood City Woman's
Club, 111 Cal. App. 2d 546, 245 P.2d 12 (1952) (premises leased for admission to the
public); Janofsky v. Garland, 42 Cal. App. 2d 655, 109 P.2d 750 (1941) (landlord's
negligent repairs); Scholey v. Steele, 59 Cal. App. 2d 402, 138 P.2d 733 (1943) (land-
lord's express covenant to repair); Hassell v. Denning, 84 Cal. App. 479, 258 P. 426
(1927) (landlord aware of concealed dangerous condition).
9. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (court rejected the com-
mon law classifications of trespasser, invitee, or licensee as determinative of the
care owed).
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rules governing the tort liability of land owners and occupiers no
longer exist. The court said that the fundamental principle of due
care enunciated in California Civil Code Section 1714 should be
applied to determine the degree of care owed by one in the man-
agement of his property.10 California Civil Code Section 1714
states:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has,
willfully or by want of his ordinary care, brought the injury upon
himself.11
The court said that this principle should be applied unless there
is a statutory exception or some other reason clearly supported
by public policy.12 However, Rowland involved not a landlord's
duty to a tenant, but a tenant's duty of care towards a non-tenant
on the property. The tenant was in possession of the property.
Will the same policy of due care in the management of property
apply to a landowner not in possession? Although the Supreme
Court has not answered this precise question, the court of appeal
in Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, Ine.13 stated that the same
duty of reasonable care would apply in landlord-tenant situa-
tions.14 In Brennan, a tenant sued his landlord for injuries suf-
fered in a fall from a stairway when a handrail broke. The
appellate court reversed the trial court for failure to instruct on
the general rule for negligence liability set forth in California
Civil Code Section 1714.15
The Brennan court said that a landowner's not being in posses-
sion does not in itself relieve him of liability if he fails to use
reasonable care in the management of his property.16 Lack of
possession no longer means lack of control' 7 as it did in an earlier
agrarian society. A modern landlord may still exercise considera-
ble, if not exclusive, control over the management of his property
10. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
11. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1714 (West 1954 & Supp. 1982).
12. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100;
see also English v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224
(1977) (court stated that Cal. Civ. Code § 846, which says a landowner has no duty
to keep premises safe for named recreational activity, is an exception not in con-
flict with Rowland).
13. 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973).
14. Id. at 801, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
15. Id. at 802, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
16. Id. at 801, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
17. Id.
despite his not being in possession. The degree of control may be
a significant factor to be weighed in determining whether a land-
lord has failed to meet a standard of care, but lack of possession
itself should not create a barrier to liability.18
It is difficult to conceive of any legitimate public interest to be
served by creating an exception to the section 1714 duty standard
based solely on the landlord's lack of possession.19 A single stan-
dard of reasonable care should be imposed on land occupiers and
land owners alike, with possession being relevant only to the is-
sues of foreseeability and unreasonableness of the harm20 (fac-
tors which can mitigate against liability but which do not change
the basic standard to be applied).
Landlord tort immunity has been severely eroded if not com-
pletely abrogated. However, does the duty of a landlord to use
reasonable care in the management of his property include a duty
to protect against criminal acts on the premises?
Duty to Protect Against Criminal Acts
The key inquiry for a landlord's duty under the Rowland
court's interpretation of California Civil Code Section 1714 is
"whether in the management of his property he has acted as a
reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to
others... "21 The court believed any deviation from this test
should be strongly supported by public policy. The court listed a
number of factors to be balanced before granting any exceptions:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent
of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and
the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.22
These factors must be balanced to determine whether a stan-
dard of reasonable care in the management of property imposes a
duty on the landlord to take reasonable measures to provide for
the tenant's security. (1) Because crime is prevalent in today's
society,23 it is foreseeable that a criminal act will occur if one fails
to take any precautions against criminal intrusion. (2) In a typi-
18. Id. at 801, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
19. Id. at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
20. Id. at 801, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
21. 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
22. Id. at 113, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
23. There is a crime problem in California, with burglary continuing to be the
most serious in terms of frequency and dollar loss. OFFICE OF CRmRNAL JUSTICE
PLANNING, CALIFORNIA CoMMuirrY CRImE RESISTANCE PROGRAM, FIRST ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 1 (Jan. 1982).
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cal situation, it will be relatively easy to determine if a plaintiff
was injured as a result of a criminal act because a criminal intru-
sion generally involves damage/theft to property, or personal in-
jury. (3) Moral blame should attach to a landlord's conduct if he
fails to take reasonable security precautions to protect his ten-
ants. The degree of moral blame may vary with the particular sit-
uation. (4) The policy of preventing future harm is of vital
importance on the issue of whether a landlord should have a duty
to provide security measures. The risk of crime is reduced when
a dwelling is made less vulnerable.24 Prevention of injury is an
important goal of tort law,25 in addition to compensation. (5) The
imposition of a duty on the landlord to provide protection for ten-
ants would be beneficial to the community. Not only would some
crime be prevented but, in addition, tenants' fear of crime would
be reduced.26 (6) Land owners generally can and do insure their
property to guard against liability.27
An analysis of these factors leads to the conclusion that there
should be no deviation from the requirement of reasonable care
in the management of property when considering the duty of a
landlord to provide security measures.
Policy Justifications
A number of other policy reasons justify a landlord's duty to
provide reasonable protection for the tenant. The landlord is in
the superior economic position to install security devices. The
cost of the installation can be spread over all tenants.28 The lim-
24. '"The crime risk to a residence may be reduced by measures that decrease
its vulnerability or measures that reduce the crime pressure in the area." U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, RESIDEN-
TLUL SECURrrY 7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as RESIDENTIAL SECuRrrY].
25. "When the decisions of the courts become known, and defendants realize
that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to prevent the
occurrence of the harm" W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 23 (4th ed. 1971).
26. There is much public anxiety about crime. RESIDENTIAL SECURITY, supra
note 24, at 14.
27. General liability property insurance will generally cover any liability re-
sulting from the business venture. Telephone interview with Ron Ortega, Prop-
erty Supervisor, Hartford Insurance (Dec. 29, 1982).
28. "Nor in this highly mobile society should tenants be required to invest
substantial sums in improvements that might outlast their tenancy. The landlord,
however, can spread the cost of maintenance over an extended period of time
among all residents enjoying its benefits." Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 220,
412 A.2d 436, 442 (1980).
ited stay of a mobile tenant may not justify the expenditure by
that tenant to provide the needed protection.
The landlord, particularly in a multi-unit apartment, has greater
control over the property. In addition, securing the premises re-
quires installation of equipment in common areas of the building
that are controlled by the landlord.
The housing shortage has left the tenant with little bargaining
power to obtain the desired level of protection in housing.29 The
modern tenant is essentially in the same position in regard to
housing as he is in the purchase of other consumer goods.30 He
should be able to rely on his reasonable expectations that the
premises he is renting are suitable as a living unit.3 1 Suitability
should include protection from criminals.
DUTY TO PROTECT AGAINST THE CONDUCT OF ANOTHER
Duty at Common Law
Even with the erosion of common law landlord tort immunities
and the imposition of a landlord's duty to use reasonable care in
the management of his property, there is another duty principle
that has traditionally relieved landlords of liability for injuries
sustained by a tenant as a result of a criminal act. At common
law, an individual generally had no duty to control the negligent
or criminal act of a third person.3 2 The act of the intervening
third person was ordinarily regarded as a superseding cause re-
lieving the initial actor of any liability. Exceptions to this general
rule of non-liability were recognized only if the defendant stood
in some special relationship to the victim or to the dangerous
third person.3 3 Examples of traditionally recognized special rela-
tionships include carrier-passenger,3 4 innkeeper-guest, 5 and cus-
29. See generally BRowN, Roos, & COSTA, CURING CALIFORNIA's HOUSING
ILLs-A DEMOCRATIC PRESCRIPTON, ASSEMBLY COM=E ON HOUSING AND CoM-
UNrrTY DEVELoPMENT 2 (March 24, 1982) (supply of housing is not keeping up with
demand).
30. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 711 (1974).
31. "A tenant may reasonably expect that the product he is purchasing is fit
for the purpose for which it is obtained, that is, a living unit." Id. at 625, 517 P.2d at
1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
32. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976); Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 65, 271 P.2d 23, 27
(1954).
33. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 23.
34. See, e.g., Schwerin v. IC. Capwell Co., 140 Cal. App. 1, 34 P.2d 1050 (1934).
35. See, e.g., Kingen v. Weyant, 148 Cal. App. 2d 656, 307 P.2d 369 (1957).
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todian-ward.36 The foundation of a special relationship was that
the passenger, guest, or ward had placed himself under the con-
trol of the other party and, therefore, was entitled to protection.37
The landlord-tenant relationship traditionally has not been seen
as a "special" one that would impose a duty of protection. In fact,
quite the opposite view developed in landlord-tenant law.38 The
law did not view a tenant as having submitted himself to the land-
lord's control. In the earlier agrarian society, possession and con-
trol of the land were handed over to the lessee, ending most, if
not all, of the landlord's control of the property and of the tenant
for the term of the lease.39 Because control was essential to find-
ing a-special relationship, the landlord-tenant arrangement was
traditionally seen as outside such a relationship.
Landlord-Tenant As a Special Relationship
The realities of modern urban life have prompted some courts
to redefine landlords' duties. This new conceptualization has in-
cluded viewing the landlord-tenant relationship as a "special" one
that justifies imposing a duty on the landlord to provide some pro-
tection against criminal acts.4o
Some cases reach this result by analogizing the landlord-tenant
relationship to the innkeeper-guest relationship.41 The modern-
day landlord is viewed as having a similar degree of control over
the leased building as the innkeeper has over the hotel. Tenants,
particularly those in large apartment complexes, give virtually
complete control over their protection to the landlord. The tenant
generally cannot hire a private police force nor install major se-
curity devices. Along with the landlord's control comes the con-
comitant duty to take reasonable precautions to protect against
anticipated attacks by third parties.
Other cases have added the landlord-tenant relationship to the
special relationship category without making the innkeeper-guest
36. See, e.g., Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d 141, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892
(1962).
37. See supra notes 33-35.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
39. See supra note 6.
40. See cases cited supra note 1.
41. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477,
482 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
analogy.42 The landlord not only has more control than the ten-
ant, he also has the greater incentive and capacity to maintain the
premises and provide the needed security because he is in the
superior financial position. 43 Some California appellate court
cases have designated the landlord-tenant relationship as a spe-
cial one. However, the cases have failed to provide the analytical
basis for this determination and they have failed to clearly define
the landlord's duty. In O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp.,44 the
court stated that "the landlord-tenant relationship, at least in the
urban, residential context, has given rise to liability under circum-
stances where landlords have failed to take reasonable steps to
protect tenants from criminal activity."45 In dicta the court in Tot-
ten v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc. 46 concluded that a
special relationship exists between tenants and landlords, which
gives rise to a duty to protect against the criminal acts of third
persons.47 In Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co.,48 the court
found that a special relationship existed between the landlord
and tenant and imposed liability on the landlord for the tenant's
injuries that resulted from the landlord's failure to repair a defec-
tive door lock.49
Weirum and Tarasoff Duty Analyses
Although these cases fail to provide the rationale for imposing
liability on the landlord for the criminal acts of third persons, the
conclusion can be justified by applying the reasoning of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in its duty analyses in Weirum v. RKO Gen-
eral, Inc. 50 and in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of
California.1 In Weirum, the court said that "foreseeability of the
risk is a primary consideration in establishing the element of
42. See, e.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
43. ' The logic of the situation itself' demands that a landlord have an affirma-
tive duty to use reasonable care to protect the tenant. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts
Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
44. 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977). The complaint alleged that
the owners of an apartment complex were negligent in failing to provide adequate
security. A second cause of action was based on the owners' misrepresentation of
the security measures in effect on the premises.
45. Id. at 802, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
46. 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1976). The trial court's decision to
sustain the landlord's demurrer was upheld. A licensee was injured in the laun-
dry room of an apartment building during a gunfight between two men who were
strangers to the landowner. The court of appeal held that a landowner is not re-
quired to take precautions to protect a mere licensee against a sudden attack
which the landlord has no reason to anticipate. Id. at 543, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
47. Id. at 546, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
48. 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1981).
49. Id. at 333, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
50. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
51. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
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duty."5 2 In Weirum, a disc jockey conducted a radio contest offer-
ing a reward to the first contestant to find him as he traveled
around Los' Angeles. Two young listeners were involved in a
high-speed chase which forced a third car off the highway, killing
its driver. The survivors brought a wrongful death suit against
the radio station. The trial court found the station liable and the
California Supreme Court affirmed, stating that an actor is not
shielded from liability for harm caused by a third party "if the
likelihood that a third party may react in a particular manner is a
hazard which makes the actor negligent."53 The court declared
that liability would be imposed, however, "only if the risk of harm
resulting from the act is deemed unreasonable-i.e., if the gravity
and likelihood of the danger outweigh the utility of the conduct
involved." 54
Weirum might be distinguished from the landlord-tenant cases
because it involved an affirmative act by the disc jockey that cre-
ated the hazard. A landlord, on the other hand, might fail to act
at all, providing no security measures-nonfeasance as opposed
to the misfeasance in Weirum. 5 However, renting out an apart-
ment might be considered an affirmative act and the lack of secur-
ity creates the hazard. Furthermore, the Weirum court declared
that foreseeability of the risk is to be the main element in deter-
mining the duty.56
The imposition of a duty on a landlord to take steps to protect
his tenants is further justified by the court's decision in Tarasoff
v. Regents of University of California. The Tarasoff court said
that the defendant psychiatrist had a duty to take reasonable
steps to protect the victim from his violent patient. In that case,
there was a special relationship between the doctor and the pa-
tient, creating the affirmative duty on the part of the doctor to use
reasonable care to avoid foreseeable harm to the victim. The
Tarasoff court reiterated the contention of Weirum that foresee-
ability of the risk is the primary consideration in determining the
duty.5 7
52. 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 47, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (citations omitted).
54. Id.
55. The common law distinguished between misfeasance and nonfeasance,
and was reluctant to impose liability for nonfeasance. See Harper and Kime, The
Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE LJ. 886, 887 (1934).
56. 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 30, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
57. 17 Cal 3d at 434, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23. Tarasoff involved the
The duty analyses of Weirum and Tarasoff could easily be ap-
plied to landlord-tenant cases. Renting out an apartment without
security protections could be viewed as an act creating a hazard
and, thus, imposing liability for foreseeable risks as in Weirum.
Alternatively, if the landlord-tenant relationship is viewed as a
special relationship, the application of the duty principle in
Tarasoff imposes a duty on the landlord to take reasonable pre-
cautions to protect the tenant against foreseeable harm. In either
analysis, the foreseeability of the harm would be the major con-
sideration in determining the duty of care owed.
LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROVIDE SECURITY MEASURES
A landlord's duty to provide security measures for the tenant
can be justified by the application of overlapping duty principles:
1. the duty to use reasonable care in the management of property
(as enunciated in Rowland); and 2. the duty to protect against
foreseeable negligent or criminal acts because a) the landlord cre-
ated the hazard (Weirum analysis),58 or b) a special relationship
exists between landlord and tenant (Tarasoff analysis). The com-
bination of these duty principles applied to the landlord-tenant
situation imposes a duty on the landlord to use reasonable meas-
ures to protect the tenant from foreseeable criminal intrusions
and the corresponding liability if he fails in his duty.
The imposition of such a duty does not make a landlord liable
every time there is a criminal act resulting in injury to someone
on the premises. 5 9 He will be liable only when the injuries result
from his failure to take reasonable precautionary measures under
the circumstances. Therefore, not only would the criminal act of
the third party need to be foreseeable but, in addition, the land-
lord would have to be unreasonable in his actions.
Foreseeability
Foreseeability has been the critical issue in the recent Califor-
nia appellate cases that have relieved the landlord of liability for
the criminal act of a third party. However, the courts equated
imposition of a duty on the psyhchiatrist to protect a third party from the individ-
ual (the patient) involved in the special relationship with the doctor. In the land-
lord-tenant situation, on the other hand, the landlord would have a duty to act to
protect the person directly involved in the special relationship-i.e., the tenant
Therefore, the imposition of such a duty on a landlord has an even stronger justifi-
cation than the duty imposed in Tarasoff.
58. See Comment, The Death of Pabsgrafi A Comment on the Current Status of
the Duty Concept in California, 16 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 793 (1979).
59. Of course, a tenant will still have to prove the actual cause-that the negli-
gence of the landlord (failure to take reasonable precautions) caused the injuries.
[voL 20: 859, 1983] Comment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
"foreseeability" with the presence or absence of similar criminal
acts on the same premises in the past. In 7735 Hollywood Blvd.
Venture v. Superior Court,60 the tenant had been raped in her
apartment by an intruder. The court sustained the landlord's de-
murrer to the tenant's complaint for personal injuries because the
complaint, among other things, failed to allege any previous simi-
lar crime on the premises.61 Similarly, in Riley v. Marcus,62 a ten-
ant sued for damages for rape, alleging that inadequate lighting
and door locks had enabled the criminal to gain entrance. The
court affirmed a summary judgment on the ground that, absent a
history of similar acts of violence on the leased premises, the
landlord could not foresee the intrusion and did not owe the ten-
ant a duty to provide protection against the assault.63
Cases that have imposed liability on the landlord have also fo-
cused on the issue of prior violence on the premises. n O'Hara v.
Western Seven Trees Corp.,64 the court imposed liability in part
because several other tenants had previously been raped.6 5 In
Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Company,66 the court said that
the landlord had a duty to provide security for the tenant who
was assaulted and robbed, emphasizing that another tenant had
been assaulted two months previously.67
This emphasis on prior criminal acts is misplaced. The poten-
tial of criminal intrusion is everywhere. 68 The courts should not
make an assault on the first victim a prerequisite for the second
to get into court. Foreseeability does not require that a particular
event has happened before.69 If the likelihood of an intervening
60. 116 Cal. App. 3d 901, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1981). An apartment house owner
petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of mandate following the trial court's over-
ruling of the owner's demurrer to a tenant's complaint seeking damages for inju-
ries suffered because of a forcible rape committed on the premises. The appellate
court directed the trial court to enter an order sustaining the demurrer, holding
that the complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to create a duty on the owner.
61. Id. at 903, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
62. 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1981).
63. Id. at 109, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
64. 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977).
65. Id. at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
66. 123 CaL App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1981).
67. Id. at 333, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
68. See supra note 23.
69. See, e.g., Beresford v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 738, 298 P.2d 498
(1955) (power company should have foreseen that a tree might fall against high
voltage lines and cause a fire); Rocca v. Tuolumne County Elec. Power & Light Co.,
76 Cal. App. 569, 245 P. 468 (1926) (defendant held liable for death of a person who
act can reasonably be anticipated by one of ordinary prudence,
the act is foreseeable.7 0 Therefore, if it can reasonably be antici-
pated that a criminal will intrude upon the premises, the criminal
act is foreseeable. A prior criminal act is not necessary for a pru-
dent person to foresee the likelihood of a future intrusion.
Reasonableness
If a particular criminal act is considered foreseeable, that is,
reasonably anticipated under the circumstances, the focus should
shift to whether the landowner has taken reasonable measures to
provide security for the protection of his tenants. As stated in
Weirum, liability would be imposed if the risk of harm resulting
from the act is unreasonable--"if the gravity and likelihood of the
danger outweigh the utility of the conduct involved."7' In the
landlord-tenant situation, the gravity and likelihood of the crime
must be weighed against the costs of prevention of harm to deter-
mine whether reasonable measures have been taken.
The degree of control over the property that the landlord re-
tains may be an important factor in determining whether a land-
lord has been reasonable in his management. 2 A tenant in a
single-family dwelling or a duplex may have greater control over
his own protection than does his counterpart in a six-hundred
unit apartment complex. For example, the house dweller may
choose to acquire a guard dog for protection. Therefore the land-
lord could do less. By contrast, the apartment dweller should be
able to rely on, for example, a landowner-provided security guard.
In an apartment complex, the landlord has great, if not exclusive,
control over the premises. When the task of maintaining mini-
mum security conditions involves the common areas of the com-
plex, the installation of such devices is out of the hands of the
tenant altogether.
In all cases, however, some minimum security standards should
be set for all leased premises, such as adequate locks on all doors
and windows.73 The minimum standards might vary with the
came in contact with some loose electric wires after a limb fell on them, even
though no tree limb had previously broken).
70. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955); Mosley v.
Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 157 P.2d 372 (1945).
71. 15 Cal. 3d at 47, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741
(1975) (if landlord retains certain degree of control over dangerous condition when
possession is given over to tenant, the landlord has a duty to use reasonable care
to eliminate condition); see also Comment, California's Approach to Third Party
Liability for Criminal Violence, 13 Loy. L.A.L REV. 535 (1980).
73. See, e.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAw § 50-a (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1978).
New York's law sets forth minimum requirements for locks, windows, and doors
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type of leased dwelling, with multi-unit apartments having greater
minimum standards than single-family homes. In addition to ade-
quate locks, multi-unit apartments might need to be equipped
with private security guards, security gates or buzzing systems as
part of the minimum security requirement.
California presently has no statewide security requirements for
residential dwellings.74 The imposition of a statutory duty on
landlords to meet certain security standards would be similar to
other types of consumer-protection legislation in housing.
75 Cali-
fornia law already requires that certain health and safety require-
ments in housing be met.76 These include such necessities as
adequate water supplies, adequate plumbing facilities, and sani-
tary conditions. Security is another necessity that would be an
appropriate area for legislative intervention.
The passage of legislation relating to security requirements in
leased dwellings would be beneficial to both the landlord and the
tenant. Landlords would have notice of their duty to take reason-
able measures to deter criminal acts.77 This notice would give
them peace of mind that the steps they have taken in providing
security measures would probably be considered reasonable.
Tenants, in turn, would be able to rely on their expectations that
the landlord has taken reasonable protective measures. Their
for multiple dwellings. A multiple dwelling is defined in the statute as one rented
out to three or more families.
74. A number of cities have adopted at least part of the California Model
Building Ordinance developed by the California Crime Prevention Association in
1978. See, e.g., SANTA ANA, CAI., CODE §§ 8-200 to 213. This model ordinance estab-
lishes minimum standards for locks, doors, and windows. However, it applies only
to new buldings, not existing structures. See California Crime Prevention Associ-
ation, California Model Building Security Ordinance 1 (Jan. 1978). Ironically, it
may very well be the older buildings located in the urban centers that have the
greatest need for minimum security requirements.
75. See, e.g., CA. CIV. CODE § 1941.1-1942.5 (West 1954 & Supp. 1982) (untenant-
able dwellings defined and statutory remedies created).
76. Minimum security requirements might be considered part of an implied
warranty of habitability. See, e.g., Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
v. Leyfleld, 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28, 152 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1978). See generally Hud-
son, Expanding the Scope of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Landlord's
Duty to Protect Tenants from Foreseeable Criminal Activity, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1493
(1980); Comment, Security: A New Standard for Habitability, 42 U. Prrr. L REV.
415 (1981); Comment, Trentacost v. Brussek" An Extension of the Landlord's Im-
plied Warranty of Habitability, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1157 (1981).
77. See generally Henszey & Weisman, What is the Landlord's Responsibility
for Criminal Acts on the Premises? 6 REAL EST. UJ. 104 (1977) for a discussion on
the need for legislation to define the scope of the landlord's duty to provide some
security measures for the tenant.
fear of criminal intrusion would be reduced.78
Deviation from legislation mandating minimum security re-
quirements could constitute negligence per se.79 This would be
no different than other areas of the law where deviation from a
statute creates a presumption of negligence.80
In the absence of legislation, the reasonableness of a landlord's
conduct in providing security devices could be determined by the
courts by comparing his actions to the conduct of other landlords
in the community. Evidence of the custom of others similarly sit-
uated is admissible on the issues of due care and negligence.81
Departure from the custom of landlords in the community may
support a charge of negligence.82
A problem with using the custom of others similarly situated as
an indication of reasonableness arises, however, when all land-
lords in a certain area fail to provide any security measures. The
custom of landlords similarly situated would be to provide no pro-
tection. But adherence to custom does not automatically mean
the landlord has been reasonable. 83 In these situations, reasona-
bleness would have to be determined by other criteria. Therefore,
legislation requiring minimal security devices would be prefera-
ble to a dependence on custom as a measure of reasonableness.
SUMMARY
Some California appellate court cases have found landlords lia-
ble for failure to provide adequate security measures. These
cases have failed to provide the analytical basis for this result.
An imposition of a landlord's duty to provide adequate security
measures can be justified by the application of two overlapping
duty rules: 1. the landlord's duty to use reasonable care in the
78. See supra note 24.
79. See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152
(1977); Diamond v. Grow, 243 CaL App. 2d 396, 52 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1966).
80. See, e.g., McNally v. Ward, 192 CaL App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961).
81. See, e.g., Fowler v. Key System Transit Lines, 37 Cal. 2d 65, 230 P.2d 339
(1951); Perumean v. Wills, 8 Cal. 2d 578, 67 P.2d 96 (1937).
82. For example, it may be customary that in all large apartment complexes a
security guard is on duty. If one large complex fails to maintain a security guard
or some comparable security measure, this deviation may be evidence of
negligence.
83. "Failure to observe custom may be evidence of negligence, but the stan-
dard is not fixed by custom. The standard is always due care. The presence or
absence of custom does not alter that standard. Custom may assist in the deter-
mination of what constitutes due care. What others do is some evidence of what
should be done, but custom is never a substitute for due care." Owen v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 83 Cal. App. 2d 42, 45, 187 P.2d 785, 786 (1947) (citations omitted). See
also Polk v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 2d 519, 159 P.2d 931 (1945); Wolfsen v.
Wheeler, 130 Cal. App. 475, 19 P.2d 1004 (1933).
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management of his property, and 2. a landlord's duty to protect
against criminal intrusions based on the special relationship be-
tween landlord and tenant.
The determination of whether a landlord has breached his duty
of care must be based on the considerations of foreseeability and
reasonableness. Foreseeability does not require a prior criminal
act on the premises. Legislation is needed to establish minimum
security requirements.
KAREN M. BRowN

